时文生.试析一则关于“中共高层1952年筹谋研制特种武器”的追忆手稿——献疑与补正[J].中国科学院院刊,2025,40(Z2):23-33.
试析一则关于“中共高层1952年筹谋研制特种武器”的追忆手稿——献疑与补正
Some arguments and corrections for reminiscence manuscript concerning that CPC’s high-level circles planned to research and develop special weapon in 1952
试析一则关于“中共高层1952年筹谋研制特种武器”的追忆手稿——献疑与补正
Some arguments and corrections for reminiscence manuscript concerning that CPC’s high-level circles planned to research and develop special weapon in 1952
作者
时文生
中国科学院自然科学史研究所 北京 100190
SHI Wensheng
Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing 100091, China
中国科学院自然科学史研究所 北京 100190
SHI Wensheng
Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing 100091, China
中文关键词
雷英夫;竺可桢;特种武器;尖端武器技术;1952年3月27日
英文关键词
Lei Yingfu;Zhu Kezhen;special weapon;advanced weapon and technology;March 27, 1952
中文摘要
文章从学术史角度出发,通过系统梳理雷英夫1990年10月20日所写追忆资料称中共高层1952年筹谋研制特种武器等尖端武器技术事,考明该手稿所示与中央决策发展新中国原子能事业、研制特种武器并无直接关系,揭示手稿背后雪藏至今的历史真实是:遵照毛泽东的指示,周恩来亲自部署有关部门,围绕1952年3月26日夜美空军3架B-29超级堡垒战略轰炸机在朝鲜战场上空施放的一种新型秘密武器事件,先后虚心请教竺可桢和赵忠尧、王淦昌3位科学家,为中央科学决策提供有力支持。此次密谈调研活动,生动诠释了毛泽东关于高级领导干部对于凡是自己不懂得和不了解的东西“切不可强不知以为知,要‘不耻下问’”的重要思想。
英文摘要
From the perspective of academic history, this study reviews carefully and systematicly on the reminiscence materials written by Lei Yingfu on October 20, 1990, which stated that the high-level circles of the Communist Party of China planned to develop advanced weapon and technology such as special weapon in 1952. The textual research results indicate clearly that, the manuscript is not directly related to the central government’s decision to develop Chinese atomic energy industry or develop its special weapon, but only revealing the historical truth hidden deeply behind the manuscript up to the present day is as shown below: Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Zhou Enlai personally deployed relevant departments to humbly consult with three scientists, meteorologist Zhu Kezhen, nuclear physicist Zhao Zhongyao and Wang Ganchang, regarding the launch of a new type of secret weapon by three US Air Force B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers over the Korean battlefield on the night of March 26, 1952, providing strong support for CPC’s scientific decision-making. These confidential discussions and research activities vividly interprets Mao Zedong’s important thoughts that, in order to get a complete picture, senior leaders should not pretend to know when you don’t, and should not feel ashamed to ask and learn from your subordinates.
DOI10.3724/j.issn.1000-3045.20240705004

